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Despite the growing amount of literature on performance related pay (PRP) 
schemes there is still very little, which examines the organisation of the schemes 
on a comparative basis.  This paper does so by examining the nature and 
characteristics of those establishments with PRP schemes from the 
WIRS90/WERS98 data followed by an examination of the schemes of 16 different 
companies from various sectors of the economy. The examination of the WIRS 
data highlighted certain distinctive features portrayed by establishments with 
PRP. A closer examination of the schemes, however, highlights that similarities on 
paper disguise many of the practical differences, while the similarities in practice 





Arguments concerning PRP usually revolve around whether the schemes actually 
work or not.  Very little work looks at the organisation of schemes in order to 
highlight any similarities or differences.  In order to understand their purpose and 
whether they are successful one must first understand the subtleties of such 
schemes. Building on attempts at generating richer material on the operation of 
PRP schemes (Kessler & Purcell, 1992) this Paper aims to do just that by: 
· examining the patterns of use (i.e. the characteristics), and 
· examining the structure of schemes (i.e. the detail). 
In doing so the paper will also seek to address the nature of PRP as an integrated 
part of HRM systems. It will achieve this by firstly examining data from the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1990 (WIRS90) and the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98). It will identify the characteristics of 
those establishments with PRP and whether there are in fact any significant 
differences between the average PRP establishment and average non-PRP 
establishment. For example, Kessler (1995) argues that although change to pay 
systems is nothing new, what is novel is the use of PRP, in conjunction with other 
HRM techniques, to support the process of organisational transformation. More 
particularly, it is said to be part of a strategic approach to the management of 
employees - performance management - linking their jobs and performance to the 
main goals and objectives of the organisation (see Storey and Sisson 1993).  
 
Being linked so closely to HRM one would expect to see certain features and 
identifiable differences present within establishments utilising PRP.  For example, 
products and markets have a significant role in the type of control strategies 
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utilised by organisations (Edwards 1986). Is there a change in the organisation and 
its work reflecting the fact that employees become valued and flexible members of 
the company; a consequent individualism of the employment relationship relying 
more on consultation mechanisms and less on collective bargaining with trade 
unions; a change in the organisations administration systems to reflect the above; 
and finally, if everyone is pulling in the same direction are there any indications that 
such companies have better relations at work and above average performance? The 
analysis produces results that highlight some distinctive characteristics about 
establishments utilising PRP. 
 
 Secondly, it will examine the main characteristics of schemes in 16 case 
study companies and the circumstances under which they have been introduced or 
developed. Unravelling a trend towards performance management highlights some 
marked differences in the ways that schemes are utilised and applied. The emphasis 
is on highlighting that schemes are very much related to each organisation socially 
and historically and are therefore bound by the organisation.  This means that, in 
contrast to the prescriptive literature and despite the promotion of ‘off the shelf’ 
packages by consultants, PRP schemes work differently and have different 
contents. 
 
The average PRP establishment? 
Defining PRP 
It is still unclear exactly what PRP is and how it varies, if at all, from company to 
company and from sector to sector. PRP has obvious similarities with Payment by 
Result (PBR) schemes, but whereas PBR is measured by fixed output norms 
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(Brown 1973), PRP is measured by the attainment of previously set objectives or 
targets.  Through these, effort within PRP is reconstituted to embrace not just 
levels of output, as is the case with PBR, but also the quality of that output, the 
level of discretion and initiative exercised by the individual. As such PRP involves 
an element of subjective evaluation of performance. In emphasising the individual, 
appraisal becomes both a means of communicating with, and to, the individuals 
involved while reward systems based on contribution to the organisations' 
objectives for sustainable competitive advantage are highly attractive to employers. 
 
Performance can be determined via the individual, the group, or the establishment, 
although the latter two are relatively unusual since incentive is thought to be much 
stronger when applied to the individual.  Individual PRP can also be determined in 
various ways ranging from progression through set pay bands based on the 
attainment of certain criteria or performance targets/objectives to variable bonus 
payments that are utilised to target money to high performing employees.  
Sometimes more than one type can run simultaneously. 
 
Despite the simplicity of its title PRP is extremely difficult to define. Useful 
characterisations available are as follows: 
'A means of translating and transmitting market based organisational goals 
into personalised performance criteria whilst at the same time preserving 
the integrity of a coherent grading structure' (Kessler & Purcell 1992). 
 
A means whereby ‘an individual's increase in pay is determined solely or 
mainly through his/her appraisal or merit rating’ (Swabe, 1989). 
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Storey and Sisson (1993) also differentiate between individual PRP that is 
measured through output criteria and merit pay that is judged on behavioural traits. 
From these we can characterise PRP by the linking of an individual’s increase in 
pay to an appraisal of their performance against the use of a set of predetermined 
criteria based on objectives, behaviours, competences or some combination of the 
three. Usually, but not always based around a coherent grading structure. 
 
PRP is argued to have all the strengths and none of the weaknesses of other 
schemes. Individually based, a rewarder and a motivator, a supporter of 
organisational, cultural, skill and objectives based on change and performance and 
capable of relating pay in the individual organisation to pay in the outside market. 
 
Characteristics of PRP companies? 
 Despite the popularity of such schemes no clear picture has been arrived at 
as yet in terms of the characteristics of the type of company that utilises PRP. In 
order to aid the image of the ‘organisation’ of PRP, it was felt worthwhile to 
attempt to construct one from data available in WIRS90 and WERS981.  In 
addressing these questions, not ignoring the fact that companies and the processes 
within them are extremely complex, a ‘snap shot’ of any distinctive features of PRP 
and non-PRP (NPRP) establishments is required. As such, the following analysis 
includes only those results that were highly significant, at the one per cent level. 
                                               
1 Original detailed analysis was carried out using the WIRS90 data. Since then the WERS 98 data 
has been analysed to see if there were any major differences. Differences in question design, 




 It should be noted that in both sets of data original variables that were 
supposed to reflect PRP produced discrepancies. The fact that two major employee 
relations surveys fail to encompass types and characteristics of PRP within a 
related set of questions highlights a serious deficiency in our knowledge of 
payments systems of the 80s and 90s. In WIRS90, the authors note that: 
“There must be some doubt that the results fully reflect (the distinction 
between PBR and PRP) and a suspicion since it was asked about last, that 
merit pay as been under reported” (Millward et al 1992; 261). 
Because of a double-barrelled question, the authors advised that a combination of 
two variables – one concerned with individual PBR and another with Merit pay - 
would provide a more reliable figure. 
Despite changing the questions in an attempt to overcome the problems in WIRS90 
it would seem that WERS98 also failed in identifying a clear enough definition 
which allowed it to capture the full extent of PRP. Based on the definition 
established above two sets of figures could be classed as PRP.  The first were 
establishments who answered positively to the question ‘do you have an individual 
or group PRP scheme’? The second included those who answered positively to 
having appraisal schemes that determined all or part of a pay increase. I therefore 
created a joint variable to reflect both of these factors.  
 
 Despite these problems the data produced clearly identifiable features for 
those establishments with PRP. Of establishments with PRP, three-quarters are 
located in the Limited Company trading sector and just under a fifth are in the 
public sector. PRP is concentrated within large multi-establishment organisations 
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of which two-thirds are MNCs. The majority are UK-owned, but PRP is much 
more likely to be present in foreign owned MNCs. Although total numbers of 
employees affected by these schemes are unknown, four-fifths of establishments 
with 1,000-plus employees have PRP, while at the other end of the scale, only a 
third with 25 to 50 employees have PRP. This indicates the probability of PRP 
being related to the size of the organisation. The PRP establishment is also much 
more likely to produce a range of goods and services which were not sold to other 
parts of the organisation and were more likely to account for only a small 
percentage of total UK sales for the organisation. PRP establishments therefore 
had many customers and competitors and demand for the product was more likely 
to be sensitive to movements in prices. Thus the majority of PRP establishments 
seem to be in highly competitive markets.  
 
 Table 1 highlights the extent of PRP by occupational group, confirming the 
likelihood of PRP being related to hierarchy within these establishments. More 
importantly it shows some significant differences in the extent of PRP depending 
on what measure is utilised. As mentioned above the ‘min.’ set for WIRS90 and 
WERS98 highlight the minimum amount of PRP captured by direct questions in 
the surveys while the ‘max.’ set highlights the coverage from the ‘joint’ variables. 
While in the first set of data the percentage differences are no higher than 12%, and 
the hierarchy hardly changes, within the second set of data there are some much 
larger anomalies. These anomalies reflect not only misunderstanding concerning the 
nature of PRP but also the growing transformation and apparent harmonisation of 
grading and reward systems within organisations. 














Unskilled manual 10 19 Routine & 
unskilled 
20 48 
Semi - Skilled manual 16 28 Operative & 
assembly 
24 55 
Skilled manual 22 34 Sales  35 62 
Clerical/Admin./secretarial 31 34 Personal services 8 38 










31 37 Technical & 
scientific 
27 55 
Middle/senior managers 40 46 Professional 14 35 
   Managers & Snr. 
admin. 
23 46 
Base: all establishments in WIRS90 & WERS 98, N = 2,061 & N = 2,191 
 
Transformation within PRP establishments is confirmed in Table 2. It 
highlights that establishments with PRP were more likely to have introduced new 
machinery and changes in working organisation/practices that reduced job 
demarcation or increased flexibility.   
 
Table 2: Any of the following types of change 
  PRP NPRP 
A) The introduction of new machinery or equipment 68% 49% 
B) Substantial changes in work organisation or practices, not 
involving new machinery or equipment 
48% 34% 
Base: All establishments, N = 2061 
 
Yet these changes in working practices were not aimed at all employees 
within the establishment. Of those establishments who were only changing working 
practices for some employees, this was so particularly within the white-collar 
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sectors of establishments. Forty percent of establishments with PRP also 
complained that a lack of skills among the workforce was limiting the way in which 
management could organise work. The corresponding figure for NPRP was 20%. 
 
 PRP establishments were more likely to have experienced reductions in the 
workforce due to automation or new machinery and changing employment 
practices and to have reduced the workforce through the redeployment of staff.  
Also the use of performance as a means of ‘managing staff out’ (Smith, 1990) was 
more prevalent in PRP establishments. Not surprisingly, then, PRP establishments 
were also more likely to think that management relations with employees were 
poor. PRP establishments were also more likely to have experienced individual 
grievances, especially over pay, and indicated that they thought their procedures 
were ineffective in dealing with appraisals and relations between employees. At the 
same time, however, they were more likely to have applied disciplinary sanctions. 
Thus suggesting conflict over the framework of controls around the effort bargain 
(Baldamus, 1961) and a search for change.   
 
 Importantly, the data point to the fact that the individualisation of the 
employment relationship is much more complicated than many commentators (e.g., 
Kessler and Purcell 1995) have hitherto envisaged. It would seem that 
establishments with PRP were more likely to have seen a growth in non-manual 
membership and recognition, leaving questions concerning whether PRP was 
leading workers to seek protection or whether it was the nature of the type of 
restructuring happening within the establishment (i.e., white collar restructuring). 
Despite Guests (1995) findings that in establishments with greater than 50 
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employees the presence of unions is associated with less use of PRP, PRP 
establishments are likely to have more then one union present and are also less 
likely to have experienced a decrease in the number of unions recognised. A similar 
picture emerged for negotiating groups although PRP were likely to have 
experienced a slight reduction due to ‘job decreases’. PRP establishments were 
also more likely to have a steward or representatives present and to have a written 
agreement for collective bargaining - with few attempts at altering these 
arrangements. As expected, those with PRP were also more likely to have 
decentralised forms of collective bargaining. Thus, companies with PRP seemed to 
be making changes to their bargaining arrangements but not necessarily attempting 
to rid themselves of unions altogether. 
 
 PRP establishments were also less likely to have a committee whose 
primary concern was for consultation. Where they did have committees, they were 
less likely to discuss production type issues. This is in opposition to the portrayal 
of employees being integrated into the organisation as valued elements of 
production (Storey 1995). Despite being more likely to have meetings for teams or 
groups over quality circles these took place only once a month and systematic use 
of the ‘management chain’ was still prominent casting doubt on levels of 
autonomy. Although more likely to give out information to staff about general 
company issues PRP establishments were less likely to give information about 
financial issues. 
 
 There was a distinction between the administration systems of those with 
PRP and those with NPRP. As expected, with larger organisations, PRP 
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establishment tended to have more management layers. They were less likely to 
have regular contact with an industrial relations specialist higher in the organisation 
but they were more likely to have obtained advice from outside the organisation, 
possibly from consultants. They were more likely to make industrial relations 
decisions at the level of the establishment but less likely to make financial decisions 
without consulting higher levels in the organisation. Thus, this suggests that 
financial or budgetary control was more important to the central organisation 
(Smith 1990) than industrial relations decisions. 
 
Technology was utilised more in PRP establishments as was the use of 
computer facilities, indicating the possibility of more sophisticated systems. PRP 
establishments were also more likely to monitor staff over a range of issues and it 
may be the case that computer technology was used for this purpose. In terms of 
the actual performance of the establishments, those with PRP were much more 
likely to think that their productivity was higher but that their financial performance 
is poorer. 
 
 The analysis above provides a picture of large organisations that are faced 
with highly competitive markets and are making sweeping changes to their work 
organisation and administration processes. Autonomy was identifiable but only 
within tight financial constraints and old management structures remained side by 
side with the new. Within the multitude of change strategies, these organisations 
seem to be attempting to individualise the relationship between reward and effort 
yet are not attempting to rid themselves of collective structures per se. The main 
changes between 1990 and 1998 were that consultation is far more prevalent and 
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establishments have experienced reductions in total unions recognised and density 
levels. There also seems to be far more direction from the centre over IR/HRM 
issues, although there is still autonomy over how these issues are applied. The 
1998 survey gives rather more credence to an HRM approach but even here the 
picture would seem rather more ad hoc than strategic. The 1998 survey also does 
much to confirm the confusion over how to assess what PRP really represents i.e. 
is it one type of scheme or many different types? Obviously, the above cannot say 
anything about ‘detail’ but does give an interesting starting point from which to 
progress with the examination of the organisation of PRP. One way to assess 
schemes in more detail is through a case study methodology. 
 
The case study companies and their schemes 
 To determine the nature of schemes approximately 60 managers, and where 
possible, workplace representatives, were interviewed using a Semi-structured 
questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with the most senior managers 
concerned with pay and related issues such as ‘policy’ and ‘finance’ at different 
levels within the organisation. The companies also provided documentation about 
their schemes. Some people were interviewed more than once over the research 
period (1994-97), thus giving it a longitudinal aspect. 
 
Table 3: Case study companies 
COMPANY LINE OF BUSINESS EMPLOYEES OWNERSHIP/ STATUS 
Electric Co Manufacture of electrical 
components  for the 
telecommunication industry 
503 US. Subsidiary. 
TV Co T.V. and Radio 23000 UK. MNC 
Bank Co Banking and Finance 89400 UK. MNC 
Retail Co (Eng. Co.) Retail chemists 81260 (500) UK. MNC 
Air Co Airline company 58210 UK. MNC 
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Insurance Co Insurance and Finance 2870 German Subsidiary. 
IT Co Information technology/Computer 
systems 
1777 UK 
Public Agency Co Public services 36793 UK 
Health Co NHS Trust Hospital 2022 UK 
Public Co Public services 52252 UK 
Tyre Co Tyre/Exhausts 5530 UK MNC 
Building Soc. Co Building Society 10815 UK 
Car Co Car service/sales 2764 UK 
Manf. Co Manufacture and fitting of 
underwater Telecommunications 
systems 
880 French Subsidiary. 
Pharm. Co Pharmaceutical manufacture 53808 UK MNC 
Oil Co Oil producer 2652 French Subsidiary. 
 
 Table 3 lists the 16 companies that took part in the research. The 
companies were selected, using the WIRS90 data, by establishing sectors where 
PRP was prominent and then randomly selecting companies that matched these 
sectors. Companies were approached to establish if they utilised a PRP scheme and 
whether they would take part in the research. A great many are MNCs or 
subsidiaries of foreign owned MNCs and are therefore quite large employers, thus 
confirming the findings from the WIRS90 data. 
 
 Initial examination of their reward schemes highlights that there seemed to 
be no limit to the number of schemes that any company utilises. Five companies 
had one scheme, seven had two schemes, two had 3 schemes and one company had 
five schemes. Within this eight companies commented that their schemes were their 
‘first attempt’, one said that it was attempting to introduce a 'real' PRP scheme for 
the first time. The rest had all changed their schemes at least once in the last five 
years. This seemed to indicate that the companies, as suggested in contingency 
theory recognised that differences may be needed to address different occupations 
etc. (cf. Lupton & Gowler, 1969; Balkin & Gomez-Majia,1987). It would seem, 
however, that, within this broad picture there were certain trends that pointed 
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against this. In particular, companies were moving towards a simplifying of grading 
structures with fewer grades but with wider band ranges. There was also a trend 
towards a single scheme for all employees, thus pointing to a narrowing of the 
amount of schemes any company used and a convergence of pay schemes within 
any one company. This could indicate one of three different factors. First, the 
choice of ‘off the shelf’ schemes to suit all employees. Second, and related, rather 
than an individualisation of employee relations an actual standardisation of 
substantive conditions of employment. Third, an indication of a HRM ideology 
applied throughout the organisation. In reality, as will be highlighted below, it was 
a combination of all three. 
 
Design of the schemes 
 Just over half of the companies indicated that they used consultants in the 
design of their present schemes and although the companies did not in general have 
very positive comments about the role of consultants, they continued to use them 
when designing new schemes. The most consistent criticism seemed to be that 
consultants attempted to push their own particular ‘off the shelf’ schemes and did 
not want to customise them to suit the individual circumstances of the companies. 
Despite the fact that most of the companies realised that their own particular 
structures were very important, only one company said that it involved its own line 
management in the design of its schemes. In most companies senior managers or 
small working parties designed schemes, in conjunction with consultants. 
 
 None of the companies actually involved employees in the design of the 
schemes although five said that they had involved trade unions. This was out of a 
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total of 13 that had unions present for at least some proportion of their employees, 
all of which now took part in these schemes. Kessler and Purcell (1995) argue that 
in a minority of cases, unions are actually able to take part on joint working parties 
and detailed negotiations to design the schemes. This is confirmed by this research 
but rather than the emphasis being on the positive side of this process, it was 
difficult for unions to do anything other than negotiate around schemes that 
management and consultants had already prepared. Unions were usually ill 
prepared and received little backup from regional or central officials. This was, 
thus, by no means an equal bargaining relationship with consultants usually 
presented as ‘third party neutrals’ rather than in the employ of the company. 
 
The main characteristics of PRP Schemes 
 The characteristics of each scheme2 are highlighted in the appendix. It is 
possible to identify three broad categories of schemes, although in reality many 
contained mixed elements. First, there were those that resembled PBR rather than 
PRP schemes; profit-related elements and not an evaluation of performance 
through appraisal determined the vast majority of their performance-related 
element.  These include Electric Co, Tyre Co and Car Co. All three organisations, 
however, insisted that their schemes were, in fact, PRP. For this reason they were 
included in the research in order to investigate how much they differed from other 
schemes. Second, there were companies where assessment was very much based 
on behaviours (e.g. Air Co, Engineering Co, Insurance Co, IT Co and Health Co). 
Finally; the rest were based on the principle of meeting objectives. Most of those in 
                                               
2 Retail Co. had two distinct divisions - manufacturing (Engineering Co, a sub-division of this 
was studied) and retail.  Thus, it was treated as two separate companies. 
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the second group aspired to a performance management system while all those in 
the third group already referred to their schemes as performance management. 
 
 Despite arguments that PRP allows a greater propensity to differentiate 
between individual performance, all of the schemes were highly centralised in terms 
of both design and application. Local autonomy was confined to the awarding of 
ratings, with many managers complaining that their hands were tied by central 
guidelines. Common factors involved firstly, no genuine link between pay and 
performance at local levels. The emphasis being mainly on controlling the 
distribution of pay from the centre. Only seven of the schemes had an amount of 
flexibility in the way awards were distributed. Further, only two schemes - Retail 
Co and IT Co - had the ability to make awards at the local level. Even then, the 
amount of flexibility was within strict guidelines for the percentage range they were 
allowed to award or the overall budgets allowed for each department. Some might 
argue that this is not surprising as all pay systems work to budgetary controls. The 
major difference with PRP, however, is that it was portrayed as being about 
individual performance. Thus, individuals expect to be rewarded according to their 
own expectations and not those of the organisation. 
 
Secondly, pre arranged norms to share out the pay pot meant the awarding of more 
to a minority of above average performers and less to a minority below average 
with the vast majority described and rewarded as ‘average’. Many of the older 
schemes contained a wide range of assessment ratings. Once again, however, there 
was a definite trend towards the narrowing of ratings, with performance 
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management schemes containing only three ratings - exceed, meet or fail - thus 
making it much more difficult to differentiate between performance. Hence, it 
would seem that that performance ratings were more about identifying the ‘very 
best’ or the ‘very worst’ performers and not about rewarding performance per se. 
The trend towards fewer grade bandings and wider salary ranges with many smaller 
incremental steps thus prevented staff from progressing through the salary range 
too rapidly. All of the schemes also contained a minimum and maximum involving 
non-consolidated pay increases once the maximum had been achieved. Where 
schemes involved performance-related bonuses, these were solely non-consolidated 
regardless of position in the salary range. 
 
Thirdly, determinants of performance were standardised and under the control of 
central HQ and new norms were set on the basis of the best performer rather than 
the average performer. Once objectives are exceeded they are incorporated as new 
norms. 
 
 Prescriptive literature, while recognising some complexities, tends to see 
schemes in neat categories even in the case of performance management (cf. 
Armstrong & Baron, 1999). The present research also identified three broad 
categories and some common themes. Despite this the schemes were far from 
uniform even though most were described as performance management. This was 
the case for guidelines on ratings, criteria and the performance pay link. In an 
attempt to portray this visually, two diagrams highlight the assessment criteria and 
the link with pay. Both diagrams are not based on ‘scientific’ measurements but 
rather “the researcher’s own judgement based on multiple sources of information” 
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(Storey & Sisson, 1993). They are a means of visualising the diversity of methods 
used without having to go through each scheme in detail. 
 
Diagram 1 illustrates the diversity of performance assessment criteria and 
the ways in which they are connected with each other. It can best be visualised as 
four separate triangles with the company triangulated between the three main axis 
of the triangle, but affected by the pull of factors in other triangles. 
 
 The diagram attempts to locate each company on a matrix according to the 
criteria used to appraise employees. So, for example, on the vertical axis 
‘productivity’ signifies those criteria that were linked directly to measures such as 
sales or output, whereas ‘objectives’ signified those criteria where targets or 
objectives were set for individuals to achieve. Armstrong (1996) argues that 
objectives should be clearly defined in quantified or output terms, thus making 
them very similar to ‘productivity’ measures. For many jobs, however, objectives 
can only be expressed in qualitative terms. This leaves much room for 
interpretation and application. In general, however, the aim was to agree objectives 
in the form of performance standards that state that aspect of the job would be 
successfully achieved if certain criteria were met. Hence, objectives could be 





 On the horizontal axis, ‘competences’ are supposed to signify a measure of 
an individual's occupational skills and experience while ‘behaviours’ signify the 
kind of behaviours which employees are to display while engaged in their work. 
‘Core values’ reflect a largely American concept, linking a whole range of factors 
that the company believes to be its core aims and objectives. These are often linked 
to the competences or behaviours. The problem with the horizontal axis is that, in 
reality, the differences between the three factors along it could be very wide or a 
very thin dividing line. For example, competences could refer to skills or they 
might be no more than behavioural factors. Competency, like many of the concepts 
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¨Ins. Co.
¨Build. Soc. Co.
¨Manf. Co.            ¨TV Co.         ¨IT Co.
¨Pub. Agency Co.
           ¨Pharm. Co.
                               ¨Public.Co.
                     ¨Bank Co.
                 ¨Retail Co.





 Armstrong (1996) argues that competitive advantage is to be gained by 
concentrating on the organisation’s unique competences. For many organisations 
the need to respond rapidly to change, a concentration on costs and the perceived 
need to develop management have made this all the more attractive. The term, 
however, is problematic and riddled with inconsistencies and lack of agreement 
over its meaning. Armstrong argues that competences represent the functional 
aspect while behaviours represent those that affect the job. Antonacopoulou and 
FitzGerald (1996: p27), however, assert that competences are ‘virtues unique to 
each individual which are expressed in the process of interacting with others in a 
given social context’, thus making them ‘more’ than a set of skills.   
 
 The idea behind a competency framework is to develop an accepted 
inventory of competences so those standards can be applied to the diagnosis and 
fulfilment of development. Skills are, however, to a large extent, socially 
constructed and the way that any one person utilises a skill may be different to 
another’s approach. As such competences may be more to do with attempting to 
standardise. 
 
“The task of detailing competences is unlikely ever to be completed, the 
movement is a manifestation of the quest for certainty in human affairs...In 
this respect, competency based models can be viewed as an effort to exert a 
controlling and restricting influence…In as much as the competency 
statements are compiled apart from the circumstances to which they allude, 
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they carry with them an air of artificiality” (Antonacopoulou and 
FitzGerald, 1996: 32). 
 
 Therefore they are less about performance and learning, and more about 
measurement and accreditation. For example, Bank Co utilised a standardised 
performance contract based on competences and objective setting while in Agency 
Co objective-setting was related to the core values of the company while 
competences where used to define performance.  
 
 Diagram 2 further illustrates the diversity of means that are then used to 
relate appraisal to the pay link. Again the main purpose of the appraisal/pay matrix 
is to show the diversity of schemes. The two categories in the centre of the matrix 
signify that most of the companies have a rating system and band ranges within 
their grading structure. The categories along the outside of the hexagon show the 
different methods used to link reward to the individual’s performance.  
 
 ‘Direct’ refers to where there is a direct relationship between performance 
and some element of the reward package, as is the case with Tyre Co whose 
performance related element is directly related to their production via profit levels. 
‘Discretion’ refers to the case where managers have some element of opportunity 
to award as they see fit, but often within guidelines.   
 
 ‘General’ refers to those cases where there is a general cost-of-living 
increase as well as a PRP element. ‘Shares’ is exactly as it implies in that the ‘pay 
pot’ will be shared out on the basis of some pre-determined formula of so many 
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shares per rating. ‘Scores’ refers to those schemes where an overall score is applied 
to performance and then amounts of pay are allocated to certain scores (e.g. Health 
Co).   
DIAGRAM 2 
 
‘Levels’ are where the pay bands are split into layers for the purpose of sharing out 
pay within a particular pay spine (e.g. Public Co). Each of the latter three have in 
common a preoccupation with controlling the distribution of pay into either a 
forced distribution, which implies a normal distribution of performance, or a 
ranking which largely makes the same assumption. The headings have been 
arranged around each trapezium within the diagram so as to allow the company to 
be further distinguished between the various other factors. For example, at Tyre Co 





























branch and individual shares which are based on the representation of skill and 
hierarchy. 
 
Another example is Air Co where ratings were scored through a complex software 
programme which then distributes them into levels which gives a percentage 
increase depending where one was located in the pay range. The two diagrams do 
not relate to each other but they do emphasise the diversity of means available to 
companies. The following six examples highlight in greater detail how the various 
factors interacted. In line with the three categories identified above the first 
example initially resembled a PBR scheme; the next three embody 




This was a scheme portrayed as PRP but was in fact based on a number of very 
different factors and would have been easily mistaken for a PBR scheme. Within 
the car industry it is becoming more and more important for sales and garage staff 
to be trained to the specifications of the particular car manufacturers which they 
attach their dealership to. As such this scheme was introduced as a means of 
dealing with a specific problem experienced by the company due to the reluctance 
of salespersons to attend training courses because it represented lost earnings in the 
shape of less commission (when away from the garage). The new scheme 




The main scheme was the salespersons package. The criteria for higher basic is 
level of achievement and training and the higher the marks for training, the higher 
the basic salary. The training centre carry out the actual gradings, informing each 
garage manager what grade the person has made and what basic he is entitled to. 
The basic varies between £6,000 to £10,000 so includes quite a variable element. 
The PRP package also included other elements based on car sales commission and 
appraisal of performance. For the sales element the pay matrix is slightly different 
from new to used cars and the matrix is fixed so that the more you sell, the more 
you get. A similar scheme is in place for business managers and controllers, but the 
matrix is based on gross profit. 
 
Interestingly the variable element of salary was declining - for managers it had 
reduced from 50% to 25% - in an attempt to encourage all round performance 
(e.g. encourage after sales service instead of just selling regardless). The HR 
director commented that ‘The old system with low basic and high commission 
didn’t encourage the right kind of people to come to work for us’. In fact the 
company were undergoing an experiment in one of its garages where salesmen 
were paid a basic wage only. 
 
IT Co. 
This company had just undergone a management buyout from the original owners. 
The company is in a very competitive industry in terms of skills and expertise and 
the poaching of staff is by no means unusual. Therefore a key aim of the scheme 
was not to pay for performance per se but rather to be able to reward top 
performers or those in vulnerable areas of work. The scheme was composed of 
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nine generic competencies: People orientation; Communication skills; Technical 
ability; Initiative; Planning and organisation/organising; Motivation; Commercial 
orientation; Leadership/control; and Decision-making. Each has a detailed 
description of the competence and an example of the two extremes of performance 
- ‘excels’ and ‘needs development’. Each of these competences are appraised and 
rated from AA to D and then an overall rating - AA to D – is awarded.  
 
Appraisers are asked to list whether employees are at risk of leaving the company 
and their importance to the company. This is purely to give a subjective assessment 
of whether they would need to pay particular individuals additional money to retain 
them. Appraisers are asked to give a ranking between 1 and XX, number 1 being 
the person of greatest importance, XX the least. Despite the competency ratings 
there was no objective way of allocating the money. It was purely awarded to 
those who the company considered most valuable. Strong objections from 
employees as to the subjective nature of the scheme have led the company to 
search for a more objective scheme. 
 
Insurance Co. 
This is one of the UK’s leading insurance companies. Having passed through the 
hands of two major conglomerates it became a member of Europe’s largest 
insurance group in the mid to late 1980s. However, the company still operates as 
an autonomous company with its overall policy decisions determined by ‘its own’ 
board of directors. 
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The company used six basic steps to help determine salaries. The first four are used 
to establish an equitable salary structure. The final two are used to evaluate job 
performance and provide pay reviews: Job specification; Job evaluation; Salary 
ranges; Salary surveys; Performance linked to pay; and PTR (performance and 
target review). 
 
Each salary range has a minimum, bar and maximum. (Minimum = new employees; 
Bar = continued/continuing good performance; Maximum = sustained outstanding 
performance). The Assessment form contains 14 sections which are based within 
the following six main categories: Job knowledge (1 section); Quantity of work (2 
sections); Quality of work (3 sections); Relationship with others (3 sections); 
Communication (2 sections); and Supervision (3 sections). 
 
All sections require a rating in one of five performance categories: 
· Every time   9 points 
· Nearly always  7 points 
· Usually   5 points 
· Sometimes   2 points 
· Rarely   0 points 
 
Scores are then totalled in the range 0 - 126.  Ranking orders are then separated 
into performance levels to suit distribution levels necessary to utilise the budget. 
Each performance level then attracts a different pay increase.  Only levels 1 and 2 
can progress past the bar point and scores are monitored very carefully. Payments 
above the maximum come in the form of unconsolidated bonuses, as do payments 
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above the bar for performance levels other than 1 and 2. A performance and target 
review (PTR) examines the breakdown of company objectives, above and beyond 
specifications and a personal development review examines competences and 
assessment criteria, etc. 
 
Health Co. 
This was the first NHS trust to introduce PRP for nurses and midwives and as such 
were seen at the time as a standard bearer for the promotion of deregulated pay 
into the public health services. Again this was a very complicated and mechanistic 
system based on detailed and large ‘standard grids’ which are supposed to reflect 
the skills and additional duties undertaken by individuals. In effect it was set up to 
encourage individuals to carry out additional duties above and beyond those under 
traditional demarcation lines and working practices for nurses and midwifes. 
 
Standards are assessed in key areas of work - standards grids - and contribution is 
assessed under each of the following headings: 
Unsatisfactory = 0; Expected = 1; Very good = 2; Outstanding =3. 
The total score under each heading is taken by multiplying it with a weighting 
(known only by the Trust), producing a potential maximum score of 300. 
 
It is not automatic that if the majority of your ratings are very good your overall 
score will be a ‘very good’. The number of increments someone receives is 
dependent not only on the final rating but also position within the pay spine. It is in 
fact a decelerating model of incremental progression with the standards grids, each 
with 15 different criteria, carrying different weightings for the different professions. 
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The 15 standards then incorporate four assessment ratings and how they should be 
interpreted for each job. Although this scheme appeared to be based mainly around 




The Agency were originally instructed to introduce PRP by the government, but 
since given freedom to design their own reward systems have continued with it. 
The scheme was introduced one group at a time until the principle of pay and 
appraisal harmonised across all grades. The phased introduction of the system is 
now complete. 
 
The Agency say that all jobholders should understand how their jobs integrate with 
their business objectives and the business plan for their office or team. The Agency 
receives its annual performance agreement (APA) from the Treasury. This is then 
cascaded by splitting it into manageable blocks with clearly identified objectives. 
This is then used as a Tool for management and development. Employee 
involvement was considered essential and jobholders are expected to: 
· Set up a performance agreement 
· Define the job purpose and key responsibilities 
· Agree operational objectives and standards on which they will be assessed 
· Agree development needs 
 
Criteria for setting standards are established based on: Speed of response; Quality 
of work; Willingness to help; Knowledge of the organisation; Telephone manner; 
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and Technical competence. There are two types of objectives - operational and 
personal development. Objective control sheets should be used to help develop and 
document objectives. Objectives are then rated under one of the following: 
‘Exceeded’, ‘Achieved’ and ‘Not achieved’. Competences are then used to 
describe the core skills, abilities and qualities required for performance at a 
particular grade or pay band. 
 
Job holders are expected to be proactive and give regular feedback to management 
who then award an overall performance mark taking into account the following: 
· Whether the jobholder exceeded, achieved or not achieved the objectives. 
· Effectiveness over the year against KRs. 
· Standard and quality of work. 
· How problems were tackled and resources managed. 
· Demonstrated initiative? 
· Are they self starters/ innovators 
 
Performance marks are in the range A to D. Each rating is awarded a certain 
amount of shares depending on the grade an individual is in. The company 
determines the value of the share and each person receives the value of however 
many shares they were awarded for their performance. In practice the process is 
very standardised and the developmental aspect is non-existent. Employees felt that 




This company had used PRP for many years as a merit payment, but argued that 
change to the pay scheme was essential to provide greater personal accountability 
in meeting objectives and that they also required the ability to discriminate in 
rewards based on performance. This is an interesting point because a major 
difference was that the old merit system was paid over and above a general 
increase whereas now with PRP the whole thing is integrated i.e. merit is the sole 
basis of increase. 
 
Now there are less grades and wider salary ranges.  Performance ratings were 
reduced from five to three and position in the salary range is now to be determined 
by consistent performance. A new bonus element was introduced which is 
completely non-consolidated i.e. not included in pensionable salary. This element of 
reward has grown much larger as a percentage of total increase since I began 
looking at the scheme. The scheme is now part of ‘managing by contract’ and 
includes four main concepts: Whole job; key responsibilities; objectives; meeting 
contract. The purpose of the assessment of performance against contract is not to 
assess the person but to establish the extent to which the agreed plans for the last 
annual period have been met. 
 
Due to the subjectivity of the old scheme the new aimed to make the whole process 
more objective. However, it should also be noted that the performance contracts 
for management are very standardised. Senior managers are issued with booklets of 
standardised contracts for each area of the bank. The only differences from one 
manager to another are the actual figures that are cascaded down. The company 
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constantly reviews the workings of the scheme and a more recent development is 
that contracts are supposed to represent all of those competencies that are needed 
in the job. Managers were critical of the new scheme and the proposed 
introduction of the scheme for clerical workers caused much controversy. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite the ability to characterise schemes in one of three typologies the above 
highlights the complexities of the different schemes. From an examination of the 
WIRS data there were certainly some distinctive characteristics about 
establishments utilising PRP. First, they were more likely to be in competitive 
sectors of the economy and undergoing much change within the organisation.  This 
fits in with the picture painted by Storey & Sisson (1993) of changing product 
market conditions colluding with changing production technologies to render 
increasingly obsolete old strategies associated with the mass production era and 
giving way to a new order with a different set of rules.  This new state of affairs is 
said to involve adaptability, customised products and services, quality’ and a 
different set of behavioural characteristics in the workforce.  Whereas, before 
employees were expected to follow rules, perform efficiently, be complacent, etc., 
now they are expected to foresee opportunities and be adaptable, attend to quality, 
seek out continual improvement, be flexible, proactive and creative within 
ambiguous settings. 
 
All of this is thought to require a much more individualistic approach. However, 
we saw from the WIRS data that the nature of individualism occurring was not as 
clear cut as that portrayed in HRM accounts. As was noticed by Sisson (1993) 
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unions are more likely to be present in workplaces with HRM type practices and, 
as was highlighted in the case studies, standardisation rather than individualisation 
was the norm. Also despite appearing more sophisticated in terms of the I.T. 
processes available to aid individualisation, there was an over-riding emphasis on 
budgetary control rather than management autonomy in PRP establishments. 
Another unexpected result was that although PRP establishments thought that their 
productivity was higher they also thought that their industrial relations and financial 
performance was poor compared with other establishments.   
 
Storey and Sisson (1993) point out that the pivotal idea of all new guru packages 
like PRP is the need for a way of managing which induces competent, flexible and 
committed workforce. However, the fact that theoretical descriptions of 
performance and assessment rely on orthodox interpretations that see the 
employment relationship as unproblematic (Newton & Findlay 1996) do little to 
open our minds to the subtle differences involved with reward schemes. Yet, as 
Kessler (1994) argues organisations have an area of choice over the way they 
implement policies and strategies. It was shown in part two that there would seem 
to be three types of schemes: those which resemble more the traditional types of 
PBR schemes; those PRP schemes based on behaviours; and those which utilised 
objectives, targets and performance contracts.  When examined in detail, however, 
each scheme is almost as different in many respects as it is similar so that, in effect, 
schemes were scattered over a broad spectrum. It was highlighted that there was a 
diversity of performance criteria utilised with conflicting results.  Objectives 
seemed to be conflicting over qualitative and quantitative components while the 
relatively new concept of competences was less about skills and performance and 
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more about measurement and accreditation. There was also a diversity of means of 
linking performance with pay. This is because organisations do not operate within a 
vacuum and cannot ignore their socio-political and economic situation. It also 
represents the ways in which the organisation wishes to present itself to employees 
and the outside world (i.e. the language of rhetoric).  
 
 The fact that schemes have both similarities and differences not only 
reflects the conflict between contingencies and latest fads but also the lack of 
strategic direction and knowledge of reward and other HRM techniques which 
managers feel they require. Despite realising the importance of their own 
organisational contexts senior managers often found themselves reliant on the 
expertise of the consultant and thus to some extent tied into which ever scheme 
was the ‘flavour of the month’. The concentration towards performance 
management schemes and competences is a good example. Another was Health 
Co. where, due to the novelty and promotion by the government of such schemes 
in the NHS, the consultants were eager to work with the Trust to establish a 
scheme that they could then sell to other Trusts. 
 
The schemes were highly centralised, a fact that points not to the disappearance of 
rewards based on collective rules in favour of individualism, but rather rewards 
based on a re-definition of what rules should apply and who should apply them. As 
was noted by Brown et al (1998) concerning individualised employment contracts 
in practice they tended to increase rather than decrease standardisation of 
substantive issues. The flexible element of PRP applied in making pay more open 
ended and allowing for much more differentiation in terms of employee job 
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requirements. This fits in with the larger picture portrayed by Storey & Sisson 
(1993) in as much PRP is not part of a change from IR to HRM but a mixture of 
both within changing political, social and economic environments. “The motivation 
to control runs through the whole of personnel and HRM” (Hendry et al, 2000). 
As these authors note the common ground with all PRP schemes is that the 
measuring of people performance is both driven and vitiated by an obsession with 
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Electrical components Banking and other financial services T.V. and radio Engineering maintenance work Retail. 
Manf./Retail Pharmaceutical 
Link to Business Plan Only via TQM Yes Indirectly No Yes 
T.U. Involvement Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship with payroll 
costs 
Cannot exceed % of 
payroll 
Budget Budget Budget Budget 
Centralised/ 
Decentralised 





No min 88 
bar 100 
max. 110 
min 100  
max. 150 
Hay Hay 
Standard, PRP or Bonus? Productivity Bonus PRP and PRP Bonus Standard, PRP, and PRP 
Bonus 





N/A ‘Met’, ‘Exceed’, and ‘Fall Short’ of contract Excels 
Meets 
Attention should be paid. 
A to D: ‘Outstanding’ ‘Superior’ ‘Fully 
Acceptable’ ‘Incomplete’ 







Additional Profit ‘Whole job’, ‘Key responsibilities’ and ‘objectives’ Professional competence. 
Working relationship. 
Planning and approach. 
Staff management. 
SMART 
‘Approach to work’, ‘Standard/quality of work’, 
‘Problem solving’, ‘initiative’, ‘Attitude to others’ 









Maximum 6% of 
additional profit 
Appointed: Depends on perf. rating and where you are 
in the range. 
Up to 20% bonus  
Unappointed: Depends on overall rating. 
 
Increment depends on 
appraisal/competence. 
Bonus paid to 20% of staff 
only but no larger  again than 
standard rise. 
% decided for each rating./ min and max. % 
guidelines. 
Min and max. % Guidelines. 
Max. n+2%, where N= 
standard rise 
 
Flexibility of the award? 
 
Set basic/ Flexible PRP Bonus - Flexible. 
Increments - None 
Flexible None Within the guidelines 
Percentage or movement 
in the range? 
% non consolidated Increments - Non consolidated after Max. of scale 
% Bonus - non consolidated 
Increment and % 











AIR Co INSURANCE Co PUBLIC AGENCY Co HEALTH Co 




Airline services Insurance Employment NHS Trust 
Link to Business Plan Yes - Unit mission statement. No Yes - ES Essentials (6). No 
T.U. Involvement Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Relationship with payroll 
costs 
Budget Budget Budget Budget 
Centralised/ 
Decentralised 
Centralised but moving towards guidelines Highly centralised Centralised Centralised 
Salary Ranges Hay min 
bar 
max. 
New pay spines with more 
but smaller steps.  
Grade with Pay spines 









Each KRA rated for success criteria on 6 point scale ‘rarely’ to 
‘always’. Also 6 point scale for difficulty. Then overall 8 point rating 
for achievement of results : ‘Unacceptable’, ‘Acceptable at times’, 
‘Acceptable’, ‘Good’, ‘Consistently good’, ‘High’, ’Excellent’, 
‘Outstanding’. 
Each management practice is then rated using the above and then a 
summary rating given Again using the above. 
Every time = 9 pts 
Nearly always = 7 pts 
Usually = 5 pts 
Sometimes = 2 pts 
Rarely = 0 pts 
Box A= Outstanding 
Box B= Good perf. 
Box C= Generally satisf. 
Box D= Perf. not satisf. 
 
Changed to 
Not met; Succeed; Exceed & 
Exceed extra loaded 
Unsatisfactory = 0 
Expected = 1 
Very good = 2 
Outstanding = 3 
Snr mngt: 
Band 1= Exceeds short and long-term goals 
Band 2 = Meets short and long term goals 
Band 3= Meets short term and some long 









KRA Success criteria: 
Met planned/agreed timescales, Met customer/client needs, Controlled 
costs and maximised resources. 
Management Practices: 
Planning and organisation, Judgement and decision making, 
Commitment and urgency, Flexibility and innovation, Strategic and 
business awareness, Communication and influence, Leading and 
motivation, Application and special knowledge 
Their are fourteen criterion broken 
down into 6 main categories as follows: 
a)Job knowledge; 
b)Quantity of work; 
c)Quality of work; 
d)Relationships with others; 
e)Communication; 
f)Supervision. 
ES Essential (6) - Each as a 
set of sub descriptions (3 to 
6). 
Key areas + standards grid with 15 criterion.  These are 











Score worked out on a 60/40 weighting of ‘achievement of results’ 
and ‘Management practices’. 
e.g. 3.6% 
Range 0 - 7% 
Scores totalled in the range 0 - 126.  
Total scores are then separated into 
levels to suit the distribution of monies.  
Each performance level is allocated a 
pay increase 
e.g. average = 4.3% 
Range = 0 - 6.7% 
Certain grades attract 
different shares for certain 
box marks. Shares then have 
a % attached to them. 
Value of share depends on 
affordability. 
Total score under each heading is achieved by 
multiplying it with a weighting. 
Potential max. score of 300.  Number of increments is 
dependent on final rating and position in the spine. 
Mngt scheme: 
Band 4 = O% 
Band 3 = up to 3% 
Band 2 = up to 7% 
Band 1 = up to 10% 
Flexibility of the award? 
 
None None None None for nurses/midwifes 
Flexible for staff 
Percentage or movement in 
the range? 
% Increment 
Non consolidated above Max. 
% 
Non consolidated above Max. 




IT Co PUBLIC Co OIL Co TYRE Co 
Products/ 
Service? 
Information Technology Tax collection Petroleum and Gas Tyre, Exhaust and Auto repair. 
Appendix 1: Main Characteristics of PRP Schemes 
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Link to Business Plan Not really Yes Not really Not really 
T.U. Involvement No Yes Yes? No 
Relationship with payroll 
costs 
 
Budget Budget  A direct proportion of unit profits 
Centralised/ 
Decentralised 
Centralised Centralised Centralised Highly centralised 
Salary Ranges Grades which are quite flexible within HR guideleines 5 new pay bands, divided into 10 spans. 
Each has a fixed min and max. but no 




Standard, PRP or Bonus? 
 
PRP A and B = PRP 








AA to D: 
AA = Excels 
A= consistently demonstrates all 
B= Consistently demonstrates the majority 
C= Demonstrates some 




Exceed extra loaded 
Rating  Exempt         Non Exempt  Incremental 
 1    Far exceeds         Excellent       Excellent 
 2    Exceeds               V. Good        V. good 
 3    Meets on all        Co Standard  Co standard 
 4    Meets on some    Below Ave.    Below Ave. 
 5    Fails to meet       Unsatisfact.    Unsatisfact. 













9 Generic Competences: 
People orientation; Communication skills; Technical ability; Initiative; 
Planning and organisation; Motivation; commercial orientation; 





Pers. Development Rev.: 
Core competences: 
Managing people; managing resources; 
oral communication; written 
communication; Interpersonal skills; 
analytical skills; decision making; 
forward thinking. 
Performance factors: 
Job skills/knowledge; problem solving; 
interpersonal skills; quality/quantity of work; 
employee development; health, safety and 
environment; knowledge/ application of Co policy/ 
procedure; Planning, org., and control. 
Exempt workers also have Key objective set. 
Based on additional profit 









Each competence has top be rated from AA to D and then an overall 
mark given using the same ratings. 
Also a category for Rating risk of the person leaving the company and 
importance to the company. 
Appraisers then have to rank their staff 1 to XX.  1 being the most 
important person XX being the least.  Pay budget is the shared among 
those people who are most important or higher performers. 
Bands are split into layers.  Different 
layers and ratings will be awarded 
different percentages. 
Overtaking on grades is prevented. 
Range = 0 - 10% 
?Percentage guidelines for Exempt/Non-exempt. 
Increment for the other scheme. 
Amount depends on average in economy 
Depending on job you are 
allocated so many shares of sales 
profit  
Sales are split into two; 
Mechanical and non mechanical. 
PRP profit is generated by sales 
above agreed targets. 
Flexibility of the award? 
 
Completely None Flexible Only in terms of sales 





Non consolidated at Max. 









Building Society. Car sales/service Submarine telecommunications Manufacturing pharmaceuticals. 
Link to Business Plan Yes No Yes Yes 
Appendix 1: Main Characteristics of PRP Schemes 
 41
T.U. Involvement Yes No Yes/no (some plants unionised, others not) Yes/no (some plants unionised, others not) 
Relationship with payroll costs 
 
Budget Budget/sales Budget Budget 
Centralised/ 
Decentralised 
Centralised Centralised guidelines Centralised Centralised Guidelines 








Standard, PRP or Bonus? 
 












1.5- Unaccept/less than effective 
2.0- less than effective 
2.5- less than effective/fully effective 
3.0- fully effective 
3.5- F. effective/ V. effective 
4.0- very effective 
4.5- V. effective/ outstanding 
5.0- Outstanding. 
1 = Needs considerable improvement 
2 = Needs improvement 
3 = Meets acceptable standards 
4 = Exceeds acceptable standards 





























Excellence; teamwork; customers; 
commitment; innovation; people. 
Key responsibilities 
objectives of which there are three types: 













Between 1.4% and 5% for those with a rating 
above 2.5. 
Plus another 1% of basic salary bill for 
discretionary bonuses. 
e.g. 3.5 ave.  Range = 1.4 - 5% 
Fixed points decide what basic via training. 
Matrix decides bonus element. 
Max 25% of salary. 
The rating/pay relationship is not quite pure 
i.e. guidelines are given but left to mngt 
discretion e.g. between 3-5%. 
Each department has own budget to share as 
please. 
There is a competency framework for each 
grade band and performance will help decide 
the level of pay that an individual should 
receive Via Matrix. 
e.g range = 0 - 10% 
Flexibility of the award? 
 
Flexible Some flexibility Flexible Matrix 
Percentage or movement in the 
range? 
% guidelines 
Bonus non consolidated 
Increment 




Non consolidated at Max. 
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